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Towards Mechanism 2.1: A Dynamic Causal Approach 
 
Abstract: I propose a dynamic causal approach to characterizing the notion of a 
mechanism. Levy and Bechtel, among others, have pointed out several critical 
limitations of the new mechanical philosophy, and pointed in a new direction to 
extend this philosophy. Nevertheless, they have not fully fleshed out what that 
extended philosophy would look like. Based on a closer look at neuroscientific 
practice, I propose that a mechanism is a dynamic causal system that involves various 
components interacting, typically nonlinearly, with one another to produce a 
phenomenon of interest.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The last three decades have witnessed the rise of the so-called new mechanical 
philosophy (NMP) in philosophy of science. The emergence of this NMP was largely 
motivated by philosophers’ realization that, in contrast with the physical sciences 
where natural laws play a central role in offering explanation, prediction and 
understanding, the life sciences are best characterized as a hodgepodge of 
subdisciplines that focus on discovering and investigating mechanisms. Another 
motive for the NMP’s arising is related to the shift from the focus on scientific 
theories to on scientific practice.  
Advocates of the NMP provide philosophers with a new framework for 
re-examining many pivotal problems in philosophy of science, e.g., scientific 
explanation, causation, the autonomy of the special sciences, to name just a few. 
However, even though the NMP has significantly reshaped the landscape of 
philosophy of science, there is still a long way to go. Recently, many authors have 
realized that the framework has serious limitations (Brigandt 2013; Levy and Bechtel 
2013; Levy and Bechtel 2016). At the heart of these limitations is the fact that 
previous work tends to center on qualitative aspects of mechanisms and draws on 
examples primarily from textbooks in cell and molecular biology, while neglects 
quantitative/dynamic aspects of mechanisms that are reflected in real scientific 
practice.  
Given these limitations, Levy and Bechtel (2016) call for an extended conception 
of mechanisms and mechanistic explanation, the so-called ‘mechanism 2.0’.1 
Although Levy and Bechtel, among others,2 point in the right direction (or so I 
suppose) and highlight several crucial points regarding what the extended philosophy 
would look like, they have not yet fully developed their proposal. So, I here, 
following in their footsteps, take up the mission of developing one version of such an 
extended philosophy and call it ‘mechanism 2.1’. My approach, largely inspired by 
neuroscientific practice, is capable of capturing both the qualitative and quantitative 
aspects of mechanisms, and dovetails well with real scientific practice.  
The essay unfolds as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the NMP, followed by 
Section 3 where Levy and Bechtel’s proposal for ‘mechanism 2.0’ is introduced. 
Section 4 proposes a dynamic causal approach to characterizing mechanisms, and 
Section 5 discusses what philosophical implications it can deliver.  
 
2. The New Mechanical Philosophy 
 
The NMP represents a bundle of closely connected but slightly different ideas 
 
1 Notice that Levey and Bechtel (2016)’s interest is in expanding the mechanistic 
explanation framework rather than the conception of mechanisms. However, I think 
an extended conception of mechanistic explanation must be built upon an extended 
conception of mechanisms, since the latter is more fundamental. Yet, their project 
does inform me of how to develop an extended account of mechanisms.  
2 E.g., Kaplan and Bechtel (2011), and Brigandt (2013). 
proposed by a number of philosophers concentrating primarily on practice in the life 
sciences (Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Machamer et al. 2000; Glennan 2002, 2005; 
Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Bechtel 2006, 2008; Darden 2006; Craver 2007). 
These philosophers all agree that we place mechanisms on center stage when 
examining those traditional philosophical questions (e.g., explanation, causation), 
even though they have not yet reached a consensus on how to philosophically specify 
the notion of mechanisms. According to one most commonly cited characterization: 
 
“Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive 
of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions.” 
(Machamer et al. 2000, 3) 
 
In characterizing mechanisms, different authors employ different terminologies which 
reflect their distinct ontological commitments.3 Setting aside these ontological 
disputes, nevertheless, they all seem to agree that a mechanism involves four elements: 
a phenomenon/behavior, components/parts/entities, interactions/activities/operations, 
 
3 Machamer et al. (2000) take a dualistic stance towards mechanisms, holding that a 
mechanism is composed of two ontologically different kinds: entities and activities. 
Bechtel (2006, 2008) also thinks that a mechanism is composed of two different kinds: 
component parts and component operations. Glennan (2002), by contrast, takes a 
monist position, holding that a mechanism is composed of parts that interact to 
produce a phenomenon of interest. 
and spatiotemporal organization/structure. Another element, not clearly shown, is also 
worth mentioning: multilevel hierarchy.  
The multilevel hierarchy is manifested by the fact that the component of a 
mechanism may constitute a sub-mechanism by itself, and that the mechanism may 
constitute a component of an even bigger mechanism. This also implies that a 
mechanism’s identification hinges on what target phenomenon/behavior is under 
question. In other words, there is no mechanism simpliciter, but only a mechanism for 
a particular phenomenon/behavior. With respect to components and interactions—in 
terms of Craver (2007)’s constitutively relevant criterion—only those that contribute 
to producing a particular phenomenon/behavior of the mechanism count as the 
components and interactions of the mechanism. 
This NMP has significant implications for a number of philosophical issues, e.g., 
explanation. This philosophy advocates a new account of explanation, i.e., 
mechanistic explanation. According to this account, explaining a 
phenomenon/behavior (at least in the life sciences) lies in uncovering a mechanism, 
i.e., uncovering how the various components interact with one another in a 
spatiotemporally orchestrated manner to produce the phenomenon of interest. 
Obviously, there is no role for laws to play, and explanation does not proceed in a 
manner suggested by the covering-law model of scientific explanation.  
No doubt, this philosophy’s attractiveness essentially comes down to the fact that 
it goes in concert with the practice in the life sciences. Yet, as many philosophers have 
pointed out, although this framework has come very close to practice, it does not 
come close enough. 
 
3. Mechanism 2.0: Call for An Extension 
 
Recently, many philosophers have cast doubt on the adequacy of the NMP (Bechtel 
and Abrahamsen 2010, 2013; Brigandt 2013; Levy and Bechtel 2013, 2016). 
According to these philosophers, the NMP has the following limitations. First, the 
NMP treats a mechanism as if it is composed of a linear causal sequence. However, 
scientists have recognized that a mechanism can be a very complex network of 
interacting components that possesses feedback/feedforward loops, whose interactions 
are typically non-linear and non-sequential. Second, the NMP routinely concentrates 
on the structural, organizational, and spatial aspects of a mechanism, ignoring that a 
mechanism is essentially a dynamic system within which the parts are changing over 
time. Third, these two features, linear and non-dynamic thinking, are always 
associated with a third feature of that philosophy: qualitative thinking. This feature is 
clearly illustrated by the way the new mechanists qualitatively describe how a 
mechanism is brought about, and by the simple paradigmatic examples drawn from 
textbooks (e.g., the lac operon of E. coli). These qualitative characterizations of 
mechanisms may help unravel some qualitative aspects of the mechanism, but fall 
short of making sense of those quantitative, often more important and more complex, 
aspects.  
Due to these limitations, an extended philosophy of mechanisms, accompanied 
by an updated account of mechanistic explanation, is called for (Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen 2010; Brigandt 2013; Levy and Bechtel 2016). However, although Levy 
and Bechtel (2016), among others, have pointed out the limitations of the NMP and 
signposted the direction for an extension, they have not fully fleshed out what that 
extended philosophy would be. For the moment, let me list those key features, as 
singled out and agreed upon by these philosophers, that an extended conception of a 
mechanism must be able to capture. First, the extended framework must treat a 
mechanism as a non-linear, dynamic complex system that may involve 
feedback/feedforward loops. Second, in addition to the qualitative thinking, the 
extended framework must also facilitate quantitative thinking. Third, as a result, the 
extended philosophy must come even closer to real scientific practice. Given these 
ingredients, it is time to portray the full image.  
 
4. Mechanism 2.1: A Dynamic Causal Approach  
 
I propose that a mechanism is a dynamic causal system that involves various 
components interacting, typically non-linearly (though sometimes linearly), with one 
another to produce a phenomenon of interest. In agreement with the NMP, my 
approach also holds that a mechanism involves four elements: a 
phenomenon/behavior to be explained, components/parts/entities, 
interactions/activities/operations, and spatiotemporal organization/structure. Besides, 
it also considers the multilevel character of mechanisms. However, my approach 
differs from the NMP in two important aspects. First, it treats a mechanism as a 
dynamic system that may involve non-linear interactions and feedback/feedforward 
loops, and second, it explicitly views a mechanism as a causal structure composed of 
components and their causal connections (Here I am not denying that many advocates 
of the NMP also treat a mechanism as a causal structure. The point is that they only do 
so implicitly or qualitatively. So, by ‘explicitly’ I mean a mechanism is formally 
represented as a causal structure using certain quantitative tools, e.g., causal graphs 
(Spirtes et al. 2000; Pearl 2009).  
This approach does not come out of the blue. Rather, it reflects how 
scientists—especially those neuroscientists—in practice conceptualize a mechanism 
(Friston et al. 2003, 2009, 2017; Stephan et al. 2007; Rubenstein et al. 2016). To see 
how this approach can make sense of scientific practice and therefore offer us an 
extended conception of mechanisms, consider an example drawn from neuroscience. 
Neuroscientists wonder how human brains respond to stimuli, e.g., visual words. The 
question they are asking is what mechanism underlies the observed pattern regarding 
humans’ response to visual stimuli. To answer this question, they hypothesize a 
mechanism involving five components (i.e., areas) in the brain: visual areas V1 and 
V4, the inferior temporal gyrus (BA37), the angular gyrus (BA39), and the superior 
temporal gyrus (STG). The hypothesized mechanism is depicted below: 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1. A schematic representation of a neuronal mechanism responsible for 
bringing about the observed stimuli-response pattern in humans. The figure is 
adapted from Friston et al. (2003, 1275). 
 
Obviously, this mechanism involves feedback loops. Also, the mechanism can be 
interpreted as a causal structure, for all the arrows, both the one-way and two-way 
arrows, denote causal connections.4 These causal connections are termed effective 
connectivity, denoting “the influence that one neuronal system exerts over another in 
terms of inducing a response” (Ibid., 1277). As can be seen from the figure, there are 
two kinds of stimuli/inputs that influence the system: a stimulus can induce a response 
by either exerting direct influences over a specific region, e.g., 𝑢1, or exerting 
indirect effects by modulating the coupling (i.e., the causal connection) among 
regions, e.g., 𝑢2. Attention to a particular feature is a case of the second kind of 
stimulus/input, for differing degrees of attention usually can result in different 
strengths of the coupling between the same set of regions. In total, there are three 
 
4 Notice that this approach differs from the causal graphical theory (Spirtes et al. 
2000; Pearl 2009), since it allows cyclic causal structures while the latter does not.  
types of interactions: (1) the direct influence of inputs on brain areas, (2) the intrinsic 
coupling among brain areas, and (3) the modulation of the intrinsic coupling induced 
by inputs. 
We have not yet seen how the mechanism can be dynamic. Given Figure 1, 
mental simulation may help us roughly understand how the mechanism works, but it 
offers no help in understanding the mechanism dynamically. To do so, we must be 
equipped with some mathematical tools. The deterministic differential equations are 
often the sought-after tools by neuroscientists.5 Now, we assign a state variable 𝑥𝑖 to 
each region of the mechanism, describing some neurophysiological properties of that 
region, e.g., postsynaptic potentials. These state variables can interact with one 
another, namely, one state variable’s change relies at least upon (the change of) one 
other state variable. The set of interactions between the state variables then can be 
expressed by a set of ordinary differential equations: 
 
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡
=
[
 
 
 
 
𝑓1(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛)
.
.
.
𝑓𝑛(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛)]
 
 
 
 
= 𝐹(𝑥)                             (1) 
 
Yet, this set of equations is insufficient to specify the mechanism. To begin with, the 
set of equations does not give us any information about the specific form, or the 
nature, of the causal relationships, 𝑓𝑖. Hence, a set of parameters, denoted by 𝜃, that 
 
5 The other options are state space models, iterative maps, etc.  
encodes the information about the form and strength of the causal relationships is 
required. The set of dependence/causal relationships, however, does define the 
structure/organization of the mechanism (Stephan et al. 2007, 130). Second, since the 
mechanism is an open system that exchanges matter, energy and/or information with 
its environment, the inputs into the system, denoted by the vector function 𝑢(𝑡), 
should also be considered. By expanding equation (1) along these two lines, we obtain 
a general nonlinear state equation for the system: 
 
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐹(𝑥, 𝑢, 𝜃)                                      (2) 
 
This equation describes how a state variable’s change is a function of some 
neurophysiological influences exerted by some state variables (including itself at an 
earlier time) and some inputs, and establishes a mapping between the system 
dynamics and the system structure. It offers  
 
“A causal description of how system dynamics results from system structure, 
because it describes (i) when and where external inputs enter the system; and (ii) 
how the state changes induced by these inputs evolve in time depending on the 
system’s structure. Given a particular temporal sequence of inputs 𝑢(𝑡) and an 
initial state 𝑥(0), one obtains a complete description of how the dynamics of 
the system […] results from its structure […]” (Ibid., 130).  
 
The equation is general because it provides an overarching framework for 
representing neural systems that can be implemented in different ways. One such an 
implementation, a bilinear approximation,6 represents the system dynamics using a 
bilinear differential equation:  
 
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐹(𝑥, 𝑢, 𝜃) 
= 𝐴𝑥 + ∑𝑢𝑗𝐵
𝑗𝑥 + 𝐶𝑢  
= (𝐴 + ∑𝑢𝑗𝐵
𝑗)𝑥 + 𝐶𝑢                               (3) 
 
where 𝐴 is the connectivity matrix denoting the intrinsic coupling among brain areas 
when no input is present, 𝐵𝑗 are the induced connectivity matrices denoting the 
change of the intrinsic coupling induced by the 𝑗th input, and 𝐶 is the matrix 
standing for the direct influences of inputs on brain areas. Together, they constitute 
the parameter set 𝜃 = {𝐴, 𝐵𝑗, 𝐶} to be estimated. With the parameter set at hand, the 
mechanism represented in Figure 1 can be redrawn below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 A bilinear approximation is achieved in the following way: the differential 
equations for each state variable and for each input are linear individually, but 
nonlinear jointly. For details of this method, see Svoronos et al. (1980). 
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𝑗
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Figure 2. A schema that re-depicts the mechanism in Figure 1 using the 
differential equations. The lower panel presents the differential equations 
shown in the upper panel in a matrix form, which can be further simplified 
using the parameter matrices 𝐴, 𝐵𝑗 and 𝐶. The figure is adapted from Friston 
et al. (2003, 1279). 
 
In this scenario, each state variable’s change, ?̇?𝑖, is a function of its own state at an 
earlier time, at least one other state variable, and some external inputs.  
So far, we have shown in detail how a mechanism can be dynamic, and how a 
mechanism’s dynamic character can be properly captured with the help of certain 
quantitative tools. However, that is not the end of the story. To fully understand a 
mechanism, it is standard practice that neuroscientists look deeply into each area of 
the mechanism and treat each as a dynamic system, i.e., a sub-mechanism.7 More 
specifically, the sub-mechanism in our example is this: changes in neuronal activity 
induce a vasodilatory signal which results in changes in blood flow, which in turn 
cause changes in blood volume and deoxyhemoglobin content. Then, blood volume 
and deoxyhemoglobin content nonlinearly generate measurable responses of that area. 
The sub-mechanism of each area is depicted below: 
 
 
7 Doing so is partly because each state variable, as representing some neuronal 
activities, can induce measurable hemodynamic responses, but the causal architecture 
of the mechanism itself is not observable. So, this is a way to get access to the causal 
architecture of the mechanism. 
Figure 3. A schema that depicts the sub-mechanism of each area of the 
mechanism. The figure is adapted from Stephan et al. (2007, 133). 
 
This sub-mechanism involves four hemodynamic state variables (𝑠, 𝑓, 𝑣 and 𝑞), 
and a parameter set 𝜗. To understand this sub-mechanism dynamically, we, again, 
need appeal to a set of differential equations that captures the (causal) relationships 
between these state variables employing the parameter set 𝜗.8 Finally, we obtain a 
full picture of the mechanism involving two levels (the mechanism-level and the 
component-level): 
 
Figure 4. A schema that represents a mechanism and its sub-mechanisms. 
 
8 This parameter set and the parameter set 𝜃 for the system dynamics constitute the 
whole parameter set {𝜃, 𝜗}, which can be estimated from the measured signal data 
using a Bayesian estimation approach. The estimation procedure can be found in 
Friston et al. (2003). 
 This schematic graph, as depicting a causal structure, together with the quantitative 
tools necessary to capture the nonlinear, dynamic aspects embodied in the causal 
structure, constitute the basis for proposing that a mechanism is a dynamic causal 
system that involves various components interacting, typically non-linearly, with one 
another to produce a phenomenon of interest.9 The next section will discuss the key 
features of this approach, and the philosophical implication it delivers. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
5.1. What is a mechanism, again?  
 
The dynamic causal approach shares with the NMP all those important insights 
regarding the conception of mechanisms. For example, it agrees that a mechanism 
consists of four basic elements: a phenomenon to be explained, various components, 
interactions among these components, and a spatiotemporal organization/structure. 
Moreover, it treats a mechanism as a multilevel system. Figure 4 in the last section 
 
9 For the limitations of space, this essay does not fully show how the dynamic, 
quantitative aspects of the mechanism under consideration are unpacked. For those 
interested in these details, please see Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2010), where they 
demonstrate via a similar case, i.e., circadian rhythms, that the dynamic, quantitative 
aspects can be understood only when certain quantitative tools are employed. 
unambiguously reflects this multilevel feature of a mechanism. Furthermore, this 
approach subscribes to the view that there is no mechanism simpliciter, but only a 
mechanism for a particular phenomenon/behavior. In our neuroscientific example 
discussed above, neuroscientists only singled out five regions of the brain plus their 
interactions and dismissed all the rest as irrelevant with respect to the 
stimulus-response pattern in question. Last but not the least, I concur that scientific 
practice is our best guide to understanding what a mechanism is—that is, we better 
look at how scientists conceptualize, hypothesize, represent, discover, and entertain 
mechanisms.  
However, a closer look at neuroscientific practice can lead us to some key points 
overlooked by many new mechanists. First, as some authors have pointed out (Bechtel 
and Abrahamsen 2010, 2013; Brigandt 2013; Levy and Bechtel 2013, 2016), a 
mechanism is essentially a dynamic system. Following these authors, I further 
proposed that a mechanism is a dynamic causal system such that dynamic and causal 
aspects are a mechanism’s defining features. This understanding implies that a 
qualitative mindset is no longer sufficient to fully understand mechanisms, so that a 
philosophical conception of mechanisms should be better equipped with a quantitative 
thinking. Second, many new mechanists emphasize the distinction between 
entities/parts and activities/interactions. However, an updated philosophy must be able 
to accommodate the fact that, being a dynamic system, the boundary between 
entities/parts and activities/interactions may become blurred in some cases. This is the 
case in our neuroscientific example, where the boundary is clear in the mechanism 
involving five regions, but unclear in the sub-mechanisms since their components 
stand for some quantities that are not clearly entities, e.g., changes in blood flow, 
changes in blood volume, etc. Though many would think that these quantities are 
better classified as activities/interactions, the practitioners do not find this 
classificatory problem worrisome as long as they believe that the state variables 
denoting them are meaningful and well-defined. 
Third, although some philosophers implicitly regard a mechanism as a causal 
structure, they fail to fully cash out this idea. In my approach, the organization of a 
mechanism now is explicitly treated as a causal structure that can be quantitatively 
described using some mathematical tools, e.g., differential equations. The quantitative 
tools facilitate understanding the nonlinear, dynamic aspects of the causal structure 
that a qualitative thinking usually stops short of making sense.10 Also, this dynamic 
causal approach largely extends the causal graphical theory in characterizing a causal 
structure, because it allows a causal structure to be cyclic.11 The causal structure 
involves both spatial and temporal dimensions, as the spatial dimension is clearly 
represented by Figure 4 and the temporal dimension is captured by the set of 
differential equations (in which each region’s change is a function of its own earlier 
 
10 So, the quantitative tools also facilitate understanding the linear aspects if there are 
such aspects. 
11 Because the variables in the differential equations are somehow time-indexed, e.g., 
each variable’s change is a function of its own state at an earlier time, the problem of 
circularity does not arise here. 
state, at least one other state variable, and perhaps some external inputs).  
Unsurprisingly, the dynamic causal approach ramifies into other issues 
associated with mechanisms, e.g., mechanistic explanation, the way of representing 
mechanisms, etc. 
 
5.2. An updated account of mechanistic explanation 
 
I follow those new mechanists in holding that a mechanistic explanation is one that 
uncovers the underlying mechanism of a phenomenon/behavior of interest. But I 
further add that a mechanistic explanation is a very complicated practice that 
often—if not at all times—involves the employment of many different epistemic 
means, e.g., qualitative tools such schematic drawings and verbal descriptions, and 
quantitative tools such as causal graphs and differential equations, to unpack the 
dynamic, causal aspects of a mechanism. This view does not deny the value of 
qualitative tools in offering mechanistic explanation, but it does insist that those 
qualitative tools can provide explanation only when the explanatory task does not 
require us to unravel the dynamic aspects of the mechanism.  
So, in accordance with Levy and Bechtel (2016), this view regards mechanistic 
explanation as dynamic in two related senses: on the one hand, the mechanism itself is 
a complex, dynamic system, and on the other, the process of constructing, articulating 
and evaluating a mechanistic explanation based on the mechanism in question is also 
a dynamic matter. This dynamic nature can be reflected by, but not restricted to, the 
following scenarios: some parts of a larger system regarded as irrelevant to explaining 
a phenomenon of interest at an earlier time may be incorporated into a new 
explanation that treats them as relevant, an explanation may take a different form 
when a new mathematical tool is invented or when a new component/interaction is 
identified, a mechanism may at some later stage be embedded into a larger 
mechanism to explain a phenomenon of interest, etc.  
This view also suspects the dichotomy made between mechanistic and 
mathematical explanation.12 Some authors maintain that there is a clear-cut boundary 
between mechanistic and mathematical explanation and that they are competitors 
rather than comrades (e.g., Craver 2006; Winter 2006). However, our updated account 
of mechanistic explanation, based on the dynamic causal approach, is able to show 
that mathematical elements play an indispensable role in building a mechanistic 
explanation. This is the case in our neuroscientific example, where the set of 
differential equations is the key to revealing the dynamic aspects of the mechanism. 
This position goes in tune with many philosophers who either show that mathematical 
elements are indispensable for a mechanistic explanation (e.g., Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen 2010, 2013; Brigandt 2013), or demonstrate that constructing 
mechanistic explanation in the life sciences usually takes an integrative strategy 
where both mechanistic and mathematical elements figure prominently and work 
 
12 Mathematical explanation here narrowly means those using mathematics to explain 
physical phenomena, rather than those purely mathematical explanations. See 
Colyvan (2012) for the distinction. 
collaboratively (e.g., Fagan 2012; Boogerd et al. 2013; Green et al. 2015).13  
 
5.3. A new way of representing mechanisms 
 
A new conception of mechanisms is usually coupled with a new way of representing 
mechanisms, and, on the other hand, a new way of representing mechanisms typically 
reflects a new conception of mechanisms. This two-way dependence relationship has 
been instantiated in our neuroscientific example, where neuroscientists’ 
conceptualizing mechanisms as dynamic causal systems urges them to appeal to 
relevant mathematical tools to capture this dynamic causal nature, and the way they 
represent mechanisms employing these tools also reveals that they think of the 
mechanisms as dynamic causal systems. Most prominently, they employ differential 
equations and causal graphs to capture those dynamic causal aspects of a mechanism.  
We must note that there might be different ways of representing mechanisms, 
which may reflect distinct ways of conceptualizing mechanisms. In fact, Casini et al. 
(2011) and Gebharter and Kaiser (2014) have proposed two alternatives. Casini et al. 
(2011) attempt to represent a mechanism as a recursive Bayesian network, where each 
variable at a higher-level can be described as a sub-mechanism at a lower-level. 
However, though this approach captures the hierarchical and causal nature of 
 
13 Some also argue that the mathematical elements are part of a broader practice of 
building mechanistic explanations (Kaplan and Craver 2011; Matthiessen 2017). 
mechanisms, it seems unclear how it can treat mechanisms as dynamic systems.14 
Gebharter and Kaiser (2014)’s approach comes closer to my approach, for it respects 
both the dynamic and causal aspects of mechanisms. But it differs from my approach 
since it brings the dynamics to the scene via adding time index to each variable, e.g., 
𝑥𝑡1, 𝑥𝑡2 denote 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑥 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑡 𝑡1 and 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑥 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑡 𝑡2. This usually 
results in a very complicated causal structure and therefore seems unpractical.  
Notice that this short section is not intended to assess the 
plausibility/implausibility of different representational strategies, but rather to point 
out that there are alternatives available and each may have its own merits and 
shortcomings. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Based on neuroscientific practice, I have proposed a dynamic causal approach to 
characterizing the notion of mechanisms. This approach shares with the NMP all 
those insights about mechanisms, but also offers an extended, updated conception that 
highlights the dynamic causal aspects of mechanisms and that comes closer to real 
scientific practice. 
 
 
 
 
14 For a more comprehensive criticism, see Gebharter (2014). 
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